"Varieties of Doxastic Attitudes." Version of Record. To cite, use stable ProQuest URL.
- Abstract: A default view in analytic philosophy is that knowledge is the primary subject matter of epistemology. In keeping with the default view, epistemologists generally confine their studies to the ingredients of knowledge, which are thought to include only one doxastic attitude, namely, belief. I argue that epistemology can and should broaden its scope. Doxastic attitudes other than belief are proper subjects of epistemic inquiry. Among those doxastic attitudes that deserve more rigorous epistemic analysis are imaginings, delusions, obsessions, and implicit biases. I consider each of these doxastic attitudes in turn, unpacking implications for theories of knowledge, rationality, and epistemic normativity.
- Committee: Nathan Ballantyne (advisor), Stephen Grimm, Diana Heney, Dean McKay, Jane Friedman
- Note: Each chapter is relatively self-contained, and readers are encouraged to cite individual chapters. Section 3 of the introduction contains abstracts for each chapter.
- "Imaginative Transportation" (extended version of AJP paper)
- "Imagining Believing Falsehoods"
- "Doxastic Regimens"
- "Obsessive-Compulsive Akrasia" (extended version of M&L paper)
- "Basing and Introspection"
- "Bias-Related Skepticism"